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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
A MISPLACED TRUST IN MECHANICAL JUSTICE
Evangeline A. Zimmerman*
In 1984 the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, ending fully discretionary sen-
tencing by judges and allowing for the creation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("FSG" or "Guidelines"). This Note proposes that the Guidelines failed
not only because they ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment, as determined by the Su-
preme Court in 2005, but also because they lacked a clear underlying purpose,
had a misplaced trust in uniformity, and were born of political compromise. More-
over the effect of the FSG was to blindly shunt discretionary decisions from judges,
who are supposed to be neutral parties, to prosecutors, who are necessarily parti-
san. This Note argues that such a shift ignores not only the underpinnings of our
adversarial system, but also the prosecutor's role in the executive branch. This Note
further argues that a return to indeterminate sentencing coupled with guidelines
for parole boards would solve this problem, realigning the power between the
branches and creating transparency in the federal sentencing system.
INTRODUCTION
With discretion1 comes dissent. One of the more divisive topics
in modern legal scholarship stems from questioning and analyzing
this very issue in the context of the judiciary. Criticism of judicial
discretion has led, in part, to the promulgation of legislation like
the Sentencing Reform Act of 19842 ("SRA"), which, in turn, al-
lowed for the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines3
("FSG" or "Guidelines"). This Note argues, however, that the FSG
failed not only because they ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment,
4
but also because they were unable to solve a number of the discre-
tion-based criticisms that spurred their passage. Instead of
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2009; Yale University, B.A. 2004. Special
thanks to Professor Don Herzog, Professor Russell Van Vleet, Michael D. Zimmerman, Beau
Burbidge and Erica Turcios for their willingness to listen, incisive comments and helpful
suggestions.
1. The term "discretion" itself is loaded and carries various meanings, some of which
are discussed in this Note. Here, "discretion" means either the ability to make a choice, or
the appearance thereof.
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
4. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Although the Supreme Court's
decision in Booker, Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and their progeny rely heavily
on this argument, this Note addresses briefly some of the problems with this analysis infra in
Part III.
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increasing transparency in the sentencing process, as intended, the
FSG blindly shunted more power to prosecutors and overlooked
the importance of designated neutrals, like judges or juries, mak-
ing sentencing decisions. This Note further argues that one
method for solving these problems is a return to indeterminate
sentencing coupled with the imposition of guidelines on parole
boards, instead of tighter restrictions on the judiciary.
Part I of this Note addresses the SRA and the reasons behind the
passage of the Guidelines. Part II contextualizes this legislation
through a brief outline of the legal scholarship evaluating judicial
discretion. It then sets out and evaluates the respective roles of the
judiciary and advocates in an adversarial system. Part III analyzes
the problems with the Guidelines, and touches on the difficulties
with the Supreme Court decisions declawing them. Part IV suggests
an alternative solution to the discretion-related criticism that
spawned the FSG, and argues that indeterminate sentencing cou-
pled with parole board guidelines properly realigns the balance of
power between the executive and judicial branches while also al-
lowing for transparency.
I. ORIGINS: THE INCEPTION OF THE FSG
During the 1970s and early 1980s, a general dissatisfaction with
the standard practice of indeterminate sentencing 5 began to mate-
rialize. Some even characterized it as a "near-revolution."6 Marvin
E. Frankel, a United States DistrictJudge for the Southern District
of New York, was a particularly vocal leader of this early charge for
change.7 He characterized the United States criminal justice system
in the 1970s as "a bizarre 'nonsystem' of extravagant powers con-
fided to variable and essentially unregulated judges, keepers and
parole officials," and stated that "the sentencing stage has come to
5. In the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing was used across the country by both the
federal and state systems. Mechanically, this meant that the legislature set a maximum term
of imprisonment, and judges chose whether the individual was fined or sentenced to proba-
tion or jail time. Within this sentence, the judge decided the maximum jail time for the
defendant. The parole boards then set the release dates. Michael Tonry, Reconsidering Inde-
terminate and Structured Sentencing, in 2 SENT'G & CORRECTIONS ISSUES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: PAPERS FROM THE EXEC. SESSIONS ON SENT'G & CORRECTIONS (U.S. Dep't ofJus-
tice, Washington D.C.), Sept. 1999, at 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/175722.pdf.
6. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
217 (2d ed. 1998) ("Nearly everyone, it seemed, was unhappy with the indeterminate sen-
tence. Conservatives accused judges of being 'soft' on crime, while liberals argued that the
sentences were arbitrary and discriminatory.").
7. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlesness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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strike me as the key focus of disease in our apparatus of punish-
ment."8 One of the central criticisms leveled against the pre-FSG
sentencing system was that it did not set out the goals and princi-
ples that were meant to guide sentencing decisions.9Judges had no
guidance in making sentencing determinations and this, in turn,
led to sentencing disparities and a perception of arbitrariness and
injustice. I° Judge Frankel concluded, with more than a trace of
frustration, "[t] he process would be totally unruly even if judges
were superbly and uniformly trained for the solemn work of sen-
tencing. As everyone knows, however, they are not trained at all.""'
Another criticism aimed at the prevailing system was that sen-
tences lacked any mechanism for appellate review.2 This censure
was compounded by the fact that judges were not required to
explain their reasoning in reaching sentencing decisions,
leading-according to some critics-to a "shadow-land of doubt,
ignorance, and fragmented responsibility.""
Congress set out to correct these problems by passing the Sen-
tencing Reform Act in 198414 and eliminating parole in the federal
system."5 The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion ("Sentencing Commission" or "Commission"), an
independent agency that sits in the judicial branch 6 and is
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 4 ("Even the most basic sentencing principles are not prescribed or stated
with persuasive authority.... Nothing tells us ... when or whether any of these several goals
[retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation or rehabilitation] are to be sought, or
how to resolve such evident conflicts as that likely to arise in the effort to punish and reha-
bilitate all at once.").
10. Id. at 7-9, 14; see also Tonry, supra note 5, at 5-6; William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2
CRIM. L.F. 355, 357-62 (1991).
11. Frankel, supra note 7, at 6; see also id. at 6-9.
12. See, e.g., id. at 23-28; Tonry, supra note 5, at 1 ("[V]irtually all these decisions [by
the judges, corrections officials and parole boards] were immune from review by appellate
courts.").
13. Frankel, supra note 7, at 10.
14. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 1-15 (2008) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2008guid/
GL2008.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (providing the background history of the Guide-
lines); Wilkins, supra note 10, at 362-64. The Guidelines were upheld as constitutional in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989).
15. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2000). The elimina-
tion of parole was done in an attempt to make the system more transparent so parties would
not be "fooled" by the discrepancy between a judge's sentence and the defendant's release
on parole. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). For a more thorough evaluation of the
SRA, and the political motivations behind its passage, see KATE STITH &JOSE A. CABRANES,
FEAR OFJUDGING 38-77 (1998) [hereinafter STITH & CABRANES, FEAR OFJUDGING].
16. But cf Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, To Fear Judging No More: Recommendations for
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 187, 187 (1999) [hereinafter Stith &
843
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composed of seven voting and two non-voting ex officio members.17
The SRA also allowed for the creation of federal sentencing guide-
lines, required judges to state-specifically and on the record-the
reason for the sentence handed down and, among other things,
allowed for appellate review of sentences. 8 Congress broadly set
forth four basic justifications for punishment to direct the Sentenc-
ing Commission in creating the Guidelines: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.' 9 Congress also set
out the following goals for the Sentencing Commission:
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion are to-
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Fed-
eral criminal justice system that-
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a) (2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
Cabranes, To Fear Judging No More] ("While the Sentencing Commission is asserted to be
'within the judicial branch' of the federal government, it has in fact been dominated by non-
judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a term of six years."
(citation omitted)).
17. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.
18. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 364-65.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (2006):
(a) FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.... The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner ....
[VOL. 43:3
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(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowl-
edge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
20process ....
Beyond this, Congress requested that the Sentencing Commission
pay "particular attention" to "providing certainty and fairness in
sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.,
21
However, as this Note argues infra Part III, the FSG did not provide
certainty in the ways that Congress envisioned and, as a result, it is
not clear that the current regime ultimately translates equal sen-
tences into fair ones.
A detailed description of how the Guidelines prescribe each sen-
tence is unnecessary as a brief summary still makes clear how they
function. The Sentencing Commission developed a rubric for cal-
culating what sentence an individual should receive based on the
severity of the crime charged and the individual's prior criminal
history, with variations based on the specific circumstances (i.e., if
the individual committed the crime within six months of a prior
conviction, etc.). 2 This rubric was approved by Congress in 1987.23
If the judge or jury in the case found that the individual was guilty
of the crime, the Commission limited the judge's sentencing dis-
cretion so she could only issue a sentence within a range that did
not exceed a six month or 25 percent variation. 4 This was intended
to minimize sentencing discrepancies when individuals were con-
victed of the same level of crime.
However, two other factors-operating in conjunction with one
another-actually shifted a majority of the discretion in sentencing
from judges to prosecutors. First, the Guidelines were initially
mandatory.25 Judges could only break from the FSG if they found
very unusual circumstances in the case.26 Second, the FSG pre-
scribed sentences based on the elements of the crime for which the
defendant was charged and convicted, regardless of the defendant's
20. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b).
21. Id. § 994(0 ("The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to subsection
(a) (1), shall promote the purposes set forth in section 991 (b)(1), with particular attention
to the requirements of subsection 991 (b) (1) (B) for providing certainty and fairness in sen-
tencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.").
22. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 11 (describing the sentencing table created to help
with calculations).
23. Id. at 15; see alsoWilkins, supra note 10, at 374.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2).
25. This changed in 2005 when the Supreme Court made the FSG advisory in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
26. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 369 ("In other words, under the SRA scheme, the guide-
lines are mandatoy, except in cases that are significantly atypical."). See GUIDELINES, supra
note 14, at 6-7 (explaining when departures from the FSG are allowed).
SPRING 2010] 845
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
actual conduct.27 Judges were forced to issue sentences in accor-
dance with the prison terms listed in the FSG, meaning they were
confined to the elements of the crime the prosecutor chose to
charge.2 8 For the purposes of sentencing in this new system, the
charging documents carried greater weight than the defendant's
actual behavior.
Interestingly, the Sentencing Commission notes that it initially
attempted to create a "real offense" system, one in which the
guidelines based the defendant's sentence on his actual conduct.
2 9
However, the Commission found this system, which was more akin
to pre-FSG sentencing, to be unworkable in the context of creating
a sentencing matrix and resorted instead to what is known as the
"charge offense" system.3 0 This methodology limits the judge's sen-
tencing evaluation to only those charges brought by the prosecutor
for which the defendant is convicted.'
Although the Commission defends this choice, in the introduc-
tion to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines it acknowledges that in
the charge offense system "[o]ne of the most important [draw-
backs] is the potential it affords prosecutors to influence sentences
by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in an indict-
ment.0 2 In an adversarial system where, as discussed infra Part II,
each side is supposed to act as a zealous advocate, binding guide-
lines that give prosecutors so much authority fundamentally
change the balance of power in criminal prosecutions.33
27. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 5-6 (comparing "Real Offense" with "Charge Of-
fense" sentencing).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Alldredge, 551 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing and
remanding because the lower court considered the actual conduct of the defendant in sen-
tencing, instead of limiting the decision to the elements of the offense charged).
29. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 5-6.
30. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 4, for a more in-depth comparison of these two meth-
odologies.
31. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 5-6; see also Alldredge, 551 F.3d at 645.
32. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 6. The Commission goes on to hedge, however, by
stating that "the defendant's actual conduct (that which the prosecutor can prove in court)
imposes a natural limit upon the prosecutor's ability to increase the defendant's sentence."
Id.
33. It is arguable that plea bargaining does the same thing. However, plea bargaining
leaves a defendant the option of going to trial. Here, the prosecutor can determine the
individual's sentence not only at the bargaining phase, but also at trial. See Marvin E. Frankel
& Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 655, 669-70, 675 (1993) (agreeing that there is "a prima facie case for the proposition
that guidelines enhance the prosecutor's power in plea bargaining"); cf. Kevin R. Reitz,
Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REv. 523, 560-65 (1993)
(proposing that sentencing guidelines and increased prosecutorial power have a positive
effect on plea bargaining). For a more detailed account of the relationship between the plea
bargaining and indeterminate sentencing, see George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109
[VOL. 43:3
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II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE GUIDELINES: JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND
THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
A full understanding of the FSG requires contextualizing this
legislation. First, to understand why the Guidelines were adopted,
one has to appreciate the general conversation and skepticism sur-
34rounding judicial discretion. This mistrust of judges played a
strong role in shaping the Guidelines.35
Second, to understand why the Guidelines failed, one must con-
textualize them in the adversarial framework of our legal system.
When giving more discretion to prosecutors, the Sentencing
Commission failed to fully consider the prescribed roles of advo-
cates in our criminal justice system and the need for them to argue
zealously. As a result, the Guidelines were unable to deliver the im-
partial fairness they set out to provide.36
A. Discretion and Its Limits
Two prominent perspectives on judicial discretion are articu-
lated by H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Hart sits at one end of
the spectrum, arguing that judicial rules can only extend so far 37
and, as a result, judicial "legislation" is a necessary part of the
YALE LJ. 857, 1044-56 (2000). A full evaluation of plea bargaining and its interaction with
the FSG is beyond the scope of this Note.
34. Judicial discretion is a thorny issue that has spawned countless law review articles
and books. This Note only touches upon the basics of the debate, which helps illuminate the
FSG and their failings. For a more thorough investigation of the topic see, for example, Kent
Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for Fetters That Bind Judges, 75
COLUM. L. Rav. 359 (1975); Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997);JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
35. WALKER, supra note 6, at 217-20 (discussing the general dissatisfaction with judi-
cial discretion in indeterminate sentencing and the way in which the sentencing guidelines
greatly limited that discretion as a result).
36. See infra Part II1.
37. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961) ("[T]he law must predominantly,
but by no means exclusively, refer to classes of person, and to classes of acts, things and cir-
cumstances ... ."). Hart goes on to argue that inflexible terminology and strict application
of the law, while predictable, can lead to absurd results, meaning that "[t]he rigidity of our
classifications will ... war with our aims in having or maintaining the rule." Id. at 127. For
varying points of view on this issue, compare Justice Warren Burger's majority opinion with
Justice Lewis Powell's dissent in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).Justice
Powell argues that statutory interpretation cannot be so strict as to produce "absurd results."
In contrast, Justice Burger argues that the plain meaning of the text should control, regard-
less of the practical outcome. This could be because, in line with Justice Scalia's formalism,
Justice Burger was more interested in establishing the means of reaching the decision, as
opposed to strictly considering the real-world results.
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decision making process on the bench.3& The Guidelines sit in op-
position to Hart's philosophy, as they limit judicial discretion and
prescribe set sentences based on only two or three criteria. Hart
stated that "a world fit for 'mechanical' jurisprudence" would be
one "characterized only by a finite number of features," and that
we would be able to make advance provision for every possibility.
3 9
The FSG seem premised on the assumption that such a world ex-
ists; Hart disagreed.
Dworkin sits at the other end of the spectrum, 40 arguing that no
such judicial decision making should exist4' because each legal
question has only one correct answer,42 which can be found by
turning to moral guidelines and legal principles.4 3 Dworkin would
likely appreciate the Guidelines for the simplicity of their applica-
tion and their resemblance to clear rules. In his book TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Dworkin analogizes the judge to a referee in a
game of chess.44 The rules are straightforward and "[t] he referee is
not free to give effect to his background convictions in deciding
38. Hart, supra note 37, at 132 ("Here are the margin of rules and in the fields left
open by the theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing function which ad-
ministrative bodies perform centrally in the elaboration of variable standards."); see also Scott
J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed 16 (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 77, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=968657#. Hart was not alone in this
point of view. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115
(1921).
39. Hart, supra note 37, at 125.
40. Some scholars have argued that the core of the Hart-Dworkin debate revolves
around their differing concepts of the law, and that their discussion ofjudicial discretion is a
derivative one. See Shapiro, supra note 38, at 4. While this may be true, the motivations for
their varying opinions are not relevant at this juncture. Instead, this Part aims only to con-
textualize the FSG by outlining various views on judicial discretion.
41. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1975) ("[J]udges nei-
ther should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar assumption, that when they go
beyond political decisions already made by someone else they are legislating, is mislead-
ing.").
42. Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60J. PHIL. 624, 636 (1963) ("[T]he judge must
attempt to reach ... the 'correct' result."); see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCI-
PAL 119-45 (1985). Toward the end of the chapter he notes that in most cases "[t]here
seems to be no room ... for the ordinary idea of a tie. If there is no right answer in a hard
case, this must be in virtue of some more problematic type of indeterminacy or incom-
mensurability in moral theory." Id. at 144.
43. Legal principles provide "separate sorts of standards, different from legal rules"
that are relied upon throughout the law's history. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 28 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY] (selection from Ch. 2,
"Model of Rules I"). Further, once a judge identifies the appropriate legal principle, he is
required to follow it. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 217 (1986) ("[O]ur judges [are
required], so far as this is possible, to treat our present system of public standards as express-
ing and respecting a coherent set of principles, and, to that end, to interpret these standards
to find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones.").
44. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 43, at 102.
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[a] hard case. ',45 Further, even if the rules' origins are unclear, the
referee, like the judge, has a duty to "protect the character of the
game" instead of freely interpreting matters in a case-by-case man-
46ner.
For the purposes of this discussion, the perspective of Justice An-
tonin Scalia is equally important, as he interpreted the FSG and
ruled numerous times on their legality. Justice Scalia is known for
being a stalwart legal formalist,7 and fits more comfortably at the
Dworkin-end of the spectrum-although he offers a different ra-
tionale for why judges have (or should have) minimal discretion.
He emphasizes the importance of the "appearance of equal treat-
ment" and the need for predictability.48 As a result, Justice Scalia
49places great importance on clearly enunciated rules and is un-
comfortable with the idea (or perception) ofjudicial law making. °
Professor Cass R. Sunstein characterized Justice Scalia as someone
who, "[a]bove all ... seeks to develop rules of interpretation that
will limit the policymaking authority and decisional discretion of
the judiciary.", 1 In short, this brand of decision making minimizes
judicial discretion by urging that rules should be extended as far as
possible, and balancing tests and analysis that rely on the totality of
the circumstances should be avoided at all costs.5 2 This logic, it
would seem, meshes closely with the FSG and suggests some of the
reasons behind the structure of the legislation. This statute pro-
vides judges with firm ground to stand on, avoids the "mushiness"
of mitigating circumstances in sentencing, and does away with a
large portion of judicial discretion. However, the Sentencing
Guidelines went too far, even for a formalist like Justice Scalia.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530
(1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997)) ("We might even say that Justice Scalia is the clearest and most self-
conscious expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of American law.").
48. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79
(1989). He argues that these factors are particularly important because they provide judges
with stronger ground on which to stand when making decisions in "hard cases." Id. at 1180.
49. Id. at 1178 ("Much better, even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion
that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can
point to in explanation of the decision.").
50. Id. at 1185 ("[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor or an established
social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement [by the court] ap-
pears uncomfortably like legislation.").
51. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 530. Sunstein further notes thatJustice Scalia's general
attack on common law rule making is "rooted in distrust of particularism---especiallyjudicial
particularism... " Id. at 531.
52. Scalia, supra note 48, at 1187.
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In 1989, Justice Scalia was the only justice to find that the powers
granted to the Sentencing Commission (including the ability to
determine the weight assigned to the various factors in the defen-
dant's history) violated the non-delegation doctrine and the
separation of powers principle.3 And, as discussed infra Part III, in
2005 he was in the majority that found the FSG to be unconstitu-
tional.54 Even Justice Scalia had to admit that sometimes discretion
is superior to strict rules, and in his 1989 dissent he noted:
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be en-
tirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments
involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers
executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree. 5
In the case of the Guidelines, even a staunch advocate of limiting
judicial discretion had to admit that this delegation had gone too
far.
B. The Adversarial System's Key Players:
Zealous Advocates and Third-Party Neutrals
The FSG, as discussed supra Part I, increased the charging power
of prosecutors. However, it is important to remember that our legal
system is largely an adversarial one and, as a result, it relies on ar-
dent advocacy from both parties in order to function. 6 Trials
epitomize the competitive back-and-forth required by this method
ofjustice and, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Tehan v. United
States, the basic purpose of a trial-and by extension the adversarial
system-is "the determination of the truth."5 7 This means, as dis-
cussed more fully infra, prosecutors-unlike judges-are not
intended to be neutral, disinterested parties and, as a result, they
should not be given the power to sentence defendants.
5s
53. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-26 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
54. Note, though, that Justice Scalia based his decision on grounds other than those
relating to judicial discretion.
55. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415.
56. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "adversary system" as follows: "A proce-
dural system, such as the Anglo-American legal system, involving active and unhindered
parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before an independent decision-
maker." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
57. 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
58. See the discussion of plea bargaining, supra note 33.
[VOL. 43:3
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The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct reiterate the importance of fervent advocacy in our
legal system' 59 In the Preamble, the ABA states that "[a] s advocate,
a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system."6° The Preamble also states:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an of-
ficer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well repre-
sented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a
client and at the same time assume thatjustice is being done.'
Such a statement could only be possible if the ABA ascribed to the
view that lawyers can divorce themselves ethically from their legal
arguments because the adversarial system will succeed in revealing
the truth to a third-party neutral, such as a judge or jury, who will
make the ultimate determination of fact. Some scholars have char-
acterized this separation as "neutral" or "non-accountable
partisanship,, 62 and have noted that without it, our adversarial sys-
tem would fall apart.
63
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct clearly state, then, that
prosecutors can, and should, passionately argue the government's
case without ethical concern. This is not to say that prosecutors are
without boundaries or are free from an ethical code. The executive
branch of our government sets internal guidelines regarding which
cases they may pursue6 and, further, in describing the role of the
federal prosecutor, Justice George Sutherland said that "while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."
65
However, once these cases go forward, a prosecutor not only "may
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 2 (2009).
60. Id.
61. Id. 8.
62. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007). Luban states that
such a point of view also holds that "[n]ot only are lawyers their clients' partisans and prox-
ies, but professionalism requires that lawyers remain morally neutral toward lawful client
ends." Id.; see also Michael D. Zimmerman, Professional Standards Versus Personal Ethics: The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 1.
63. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV.
669, 674 (1978) ("If advocates could be called personally to account for representing clients
fully within established professional restraints ... [it] would undercut the very assumptions
of the adversary system.").
64. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL ch. 9-27.000
(1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading room/usam/tide9/27mcrm.htm [hereinaf-
ter MANUAL].
65. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.,,66
In line with these parameters, the law gives prosecutors wide dis-
cretion to decide which cases to arraign.67 This means that even
though prosecutors, as advocates, are constrained by guidelines
and have wide discretion to select which cases to bring, our adver-
sarial system would not function if U.S. Attorneys could not
zealously, and to some degree amorally, argue their cases.68 As
Judge Frankel stated, "[t]he plainest thing about the advocate is
that he is indeed partisan, and thus exercises a function sharply
divergent from that of the judge."69 For this reason, prosecutors
cannot rationally be expected to act as impartial sentencers.
As Judge Frankel suggests, and other scholars agree, for the ad-
versarial system to function, judges must be set apart from the
partisan advocacy of the attorneys presenting the case. v° The ABA
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct reiterates this with the first of its four
central canons: "A judge shall uphold and promote the independ-
ence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."71 The ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct also emphasize the neutral and impar-
tial nature of judges in Rule 1.12, which analogizes judges with
arbitrators, mediators, and "other third-party neutral [s].""
66. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Sutherland also stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Id.
67. MANUAL, supra note 64, § 9-27.110(B) ("Under the Federal criminal justice system,
the prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to
prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law.... This discretion exists by virtue
of his/her status as a member of the Executive Branch, which is charged under the Consti-
tution with ensuring that the laws of the United States be 'faithfully executed.'" (citations
omitted)).
68. Again, by "amorally" this Note means free from personal responsibility for the out-
come. Although prosecutors can apply their own moral filter when deciding which cases to
bring, and should do so, once they have begun proceedings the adversarial system is prem-
ised on the assumption that each side will argue its case to the full extent of the law.
69. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 1031,
1035 (1975).
70. David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 820
(1998) (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Adversay System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 31 (HaroldJ.
Berman ed., 1961)).
71. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a) (2009) ("[A] lawyer shall not repre-
sent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
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This Note's description ofjudges in the adversarial system is lim-
ited to those directly impacted by the FSG. Although much of the
commentary set out in Part II addresses the legitimacy of "making"
new law, the. underlying evaluations and criticisms of judicial dis-
cretion still stand in the sentencing context. So although the
textualist arguments espoused by Justice Scalia, for example, cen-
ter around rule-making, the values he esteems-predictability and
the appearance of equality-are strongly reflected in the passage of
the Guidelines.
The chief function of a judge in an adversarial system-
particularly a criminal one-is to act as a third-party neutral.73 Al-
though some scholars have argued that lawyers should rely on
judges' neutrality less because the adversarial system is flawed,4
such arguments do not refute the role of the judge (or jury) as a
neutral decision-maker.
Even those who quibble with the way the current system is struc-
tured acknowledge the role judges are meant to play. Judge
Frankel, in contrasting judges with advocates, stated that
"[w] hether or not the judge generally achieves or maintains neu-
trality, it is his assigned task to be nonpartisan and to promote
through the trial an objective search for the truth."75Judge Frankel
also noted that "[w] ithin the confines of the adversary framework,
the trial judge probably serves best as relatively passive modera-
tor."7 6 Even ifjudges should be "passive moderators" in our current
adversarial system, this Note argues infra Part IV that they are still
better qualified than morally "non-accountable" partisans to make
discretionary sentencing decisions.
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an
arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give
informed consent, confirmed in writing.").
73. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007); see also MODEL CODE OF JU-
DICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007) ("Ajudge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform
all duties ofjudicial office fairly and impartially."); Frankel, supra note 69, at 1035 (asserting
that the judge's role to be nonpartisan).
74. William.H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. Rv. 1083 (1988)
(arguing that lawyers have a separate ethical obligation to evaluate the cases they take on
and, as a result, should not rely wholly on judges). Even if this is true, it does not mitigate
the judge's role in the adversarial system. Instead, it simply asks lawyers to add their own
moral filter to the proceedings. See also Zimmerman, supa note 62.
75. Frankel, supra note 69, at 1035. Judge Frankel goes on to critique the current
manifestation of this role, noting, "[t]he ignorant and unprepared judge is, ideally, the
properly bland figurehead in the adversary scheme of things." Id. at 1042.
76. Id. at 1043.
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III. FEARING JUDGES AND TRUSTING COMPROMISE:
WHY THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FAILED
Almost since their inception, the FSG have been under fire." No
system enacted by so many, with such varied and competing inter-
ests, could be free from compromise.78 Even judge Frankel finally
came to admit that the Guidelines, as enacted, were not what he
had envisioned. Professor Kate Stith and Judge Jos6 A. Cabranes,
two strident critics of the Guidelines, argue that "[t] he federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines were born of a naive commitment to the ideal
of rationality, an enduring faith in bureaucratic administration,
and an uneasiness with the very concept of official discretion."80
They also assert that the FSG are "[g] rounded in a fear ofjudging"
and aim to replace judicial decisions with formulaic sentences.8 In
short, the Guidelines were unsuccessful because they attempted to
administer the "mechanical justice" Hart warned a s2nadmiistr te echnicl sties'Har ne against, and in-
stead created penalties that did not align with the seriousness of
the crimes charged' and sentences that judges did not support. 
4
77. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENv. U. L. REv. 665, 681
(2006) ("[N]ot long after they were enacted, the Guidelines began to attract serious criti-
cism, which became more vehement as years went by ... ."); Marc L. Miller, Domination &
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1235-52 (2004) (describing
howjudges and Congress dislike the Guidelines as currently used).
78. See generally STITH & CABRANES, FEAR oFJuDGING, supra note 15, at 38-77; Breyer,
supra note 15, at 2 ("The spirit of compromise that permeates the Guidelines arose out of
the practical needs of administration, institutional considerations, and the competing goals
of a criminal justice system, all of which combined to bring about a final product quite dif-
ferent from the idealized versions of the Guidelines which were initially envisioned.").
79. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE
LJ. 2043, 2045 (1992) ("Five years ago, I would have hesitated to stand up anywhere and say
this idea [of sentencing guidelines] was mine, for fear of exposing the immodesty that I
keep trying to conceal. Now, however, I would feel obligated to say this as a matter of re-
quired disclosure or confession."). See also Frankel & Orland, supra note 33, at 656 ("I think
we can agree that the most serious complaints about the federal guidelines have to do with
undue severity, rigidity, and prosecutorial rather than judicial power.").
80. Stith & Cabranes, To FearJudging No More, supra note 16, at 187.
81. Id.
82. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 2048 ("[T]he Commission put largely outside the
pale a variety of factors that sentencing judges have treated over the years as mitigating cir-
cumstances. The results have included some evasion or warping of the guidelines-by
judges along with prosecutors and defense counsel.").
83. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) ("The positivist view [of the FSG], applied unflinchingly to this case, commands the
affirmance of prison sentences that are exceptionally harsh by the standards of the modem
Western world, dictated by an accidental, unintended scheme of punishment nevertheless
implied by the words (taken one by one) of the relevant enactments. The natural law or
pragmatist view leads to a freer interpretation, one influenced by norms of equal treatment
84. Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENy. U. L.
REv. 63, 63 (2007) ("You apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as you have been told you must
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The Supreme Court, however, did not make the FSG advisory
for any of these reasons. Instead, it based its opinion in United States
v. Booker on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This deci-
sion, and those that led up to it, are largely accepted as confusing"
and have created some bewilderment in the legal community re-
garding the Supreme Court's rationale for invalidating the FSG.s7
Numerous law review articles have been written addressing the nu-
ances and contradictions within these various cases, and this Note
does not aim to recreate these detailed assessments of the Supreme
Court's decisions.ss Instead, this Part first addresses specific reasons
the Guidelines actually failed and second, by way of comparison,
briefly describes the reasons offered by the Supreme Court for nul-
lifying this legislation.
A. A Stillborn Measure: Why the FG Were Always Doomed
The FSG were crippled from the beginning. Regardless of
whether they actually conflicted with the Sixth Amendment, they
lacked a clear underlying purpose, had a misplaced trust in uni-
formity, and were born of compromise. This Note addresses each
of these issues in turn, specifically arguing that the FSG failed be-
cause (1) they did not ask and answer the central questions that
are necessary for any set of regulations to function properly, (2)
... and ultimately come up with a result that makes no sense by any measure. It is inconsis-
tent with the purposes of sentencing in the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA); it is out of
proportion to the defendant's culpability and to sentences that have been meted out for far
worse, even violent offenses; it is not at all what the public-if they knew all the facts-would
demand."). Gertner is ajudge serving on the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. See also Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST.
1, 9 (2006). In discussing the outcome of the three-strikes laws, mandatory minimums, and
the sentencing discrepancy between crack and cocaine powder possession convictions in the
FSG (discussed infra Part III.A), Tonry noted, "[t]hese all resulted in individual sentences
that those obliged to apply them often found unjustly severe, and all violated commonsense
notions of the relative seriousness of the crimes they affected and other more serious crimes
they did not." Id.
85. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
86. McConnell, supra note 77, at 677 ("The most striking feature of the Booker decision
is that the remedy bears no logical relation to the constitutional violation.").
87. See, e.g., id. ("The Bookeropinions, taken in tandem, do not get high marks for con-
sistency or coherence. If that seems a presumptuous thing for an inferior court judge to say
about the product of his superiors, I take comfort in the fact that eight of the nine Justices
agree with me that either the Sixth Amendment holding or the remedial holding is wrong,
and that the two do not fit together."); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Discretion in
Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 693, 695 (2005) (characterizing the Booker decision,
among other things, as a "tortured interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act").
88. E.g., Klein, supra note 87; McConnell, supra note 77; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendu-
lum:Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE LJ. 1420 (2008).
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they confused the perception of homogeny with fairness, and (3)
they were too closely tied to political interests to meet the SRA
goals of transparency and fairness.
1. Why Do We Really Want Sentencing Guidelines?
First, this Note pushes back on the unchallenged assumption
(and a basic premise of the SRA) that uniformity should be a pri-
mary goal of sentencing reform. A Dworkinite might argue that
clear, unambiguous sentencing-like the strict reading of a statute
or a set of rules-provides judges with firmer ground on which to
stand when making other decisions. However, this argument ig-
nores the reality that federal courts sit within states that have their
own set of ruless9 and presumes that federal judges need not (and
will not) consider how various sentences will be received within
their own community." Some sentencing discrepancies from state
to state may, in actuality, accurately reflect the circumstances of the
crimes committed and be more commensurate with the local
populace's understanding of criminal justice. In other words, as is
explored infra Part III.A.2, varying sentences may be more fair.
Regardless of one's view on the propriety of allowing disparities,
the reality must be acknowledged that federal courts sit in individ-
ual states. Legislation must understand how a system actually works
to be effective. How could the FSG be successful if, when designed,
the Sentencing Commission and Congress were unwilling to con-
sider that other approaches, besides the strict view minimizing
discretion, might have merit?9' Perhaps allowing judges to make
discretionary sentencing decisions, to "legislate at the margins,"
gives the system greater legitimacy by enhancing the community's
perception of its fairness. If federal sentences are far more severe
than those administered within the state, it could have a negative
89. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)
("[O]ne of the happy incidents of the federal system [is) that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory .... ").
90. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 77, at 675. In describing the various reactions of
the courts of appeals to Booker, McConnell notes that the Ninth Circuit had the least down-
ward variation after the decision. He goes on to say, "[i]t is as if the district judges in the
Ninth Circuit sentence without much regard to whether the law grants them discretion." Id.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, which was one of the most compliant courts of appeals, saw
a large downward departure in sentences following Booker. Id.
91. In evaluating the FSG and the problem of over-emphasizing the importance of
uniform sentences, Marc L. Miller notes, "[i]ndeed, sufficiently complex systems, and sys-
tems structured around an abstract calculus rather than core (and comprehensible)
concepts, can obscure underlying political and policy choices that might otherwise be sub-
ject to debate." Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 278 (2005).
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impact on the federal system as well as the general criminal justice
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and so on. In any event, these
queries cannot be answered if they are never considered.92
Second, if a sentencing regime is to fully function-especially
one of such broad scope and sweeping effect-it needs to be ani-
mated by an underlying theory of criminal justice. Our current
system is fragmented; no one clear justification for criminal pun-
ishment exists.93  Retributivism was en vogue in the 1970s,
deterrence in the 1980s, incapacitation in the 1990s, and "a mud-
dle in the early years of the twenty-first century."94 In 1984, the
Federal Sentencing Commission sewed together a complicated
patchwork to mete out sentences, but it never gave the FSG a clear
purpose; it never gave it life. As a result, the final legislation was a
mutable text from which one could read out that which had al-
ready been read in.9 '
Politically, finding one theoretical justification for the FSG may
have been too difficult (as discussed infra Part III.A.3). Nonethe-
less, providing all four common-and often conflicting-
justifications for punishment (those popular in the '70s, '80s, and
'90s) added little. If anything, it made the Guidelines harder to
apply by obfuscating the real reasons for their passage.9 6 Are the
sentences prescribed by the FSG the best means of retribution for
the crimes committed, or will fixed sentencing deter criminals
since they know exactly what type of sentence they will receive? Is
the aim of fixed sentencing to incapacitate as many criminals as
possible, or are these sentences the best means of reforming and
rehabilitating prisoners? These are basic, fundamental questions
that the SRA left unanswered in 1984 and still has yet to address.
Judge Frankel initially criticized indeterminate sentencing for its
lack of clear purpose.7 In 1972 he scathingly wrote, "Nothing tells
92. Perhaps this lack of inquiry was the result of political compromise. Congress may
have realized that the appearance of equality was simply easier than asking if the sentences
handed down were actually fair. This seems to align with the way in which the Sentencing
Commission acquiesced to a charge-based system, instead of an offense-based system. It may
not be the more equitable approach, but it is easier to apply en masse.
93. Tonry, supra note 84, at 1-2.
94. Id. at 2.
95. One could argue the Guidelines became much like satiric writer Ambrose Bierce's
definition of a "review": "To set your wisdom (holding not a doubt of it, / Although in truth
there's neither bone nor skin to it) / At work upon a book, and so read out of it / The
qualities that you have first read into it." AMBROSE BIERCE, THE UNABRIDGED DEVIL'S Dic-
TIONARY 154 (David E. Schultz & S.T.Joshi eds., Univ. of Ga. Press 2000) (1881).
96. See generally Tonry, supra note 84, for a thorough discussion of the latent reasons
for some of our sentencing laws, including "the use of sentencing 'reforms' to achieve per-
sonal, partisan, and ideological goals." Id. at 9.
97. See supra Part I.
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us ... when or whether any of these several goals [retribution, de-
terrence, denunciation, incapacitation or rehabilitation] are to be
sought, or how to resolve such evident conflicts as that likely arise
in the effort to punish and rehabilitate all at once."98 However, the
Sentencing Commission never solved this problem. In fact, it never
even addressed it. Thirty years later, Judge Frankel had to acknowl-
edge that this difficulty remained:
[T]he Commission had done little or nothing about the
hardest problem of all: it has not advanced the education of
Congress, or any of us, about what we mean to achieve, and
what we in fact achieve, as we continue to mete out long
prison sentences.
•.. We still scarcely know what we're doing or why we're do-
ing it, when we inflict punishment for a crime.99
This strongly contributed to the FSG's failure. One cannot ask for
uniformity without knowing why it is desirable.' ° This leaves judges
and prosecutors without any real guidance and opens the FSG to
the same opaque application that led to the near-complete eradica-
tion of indeterminate sentencing. Michael Tonry, one of the
leading scholars on sentencing, discusses this problem in depth in
his article, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing.'1 ' He reiterates that
fair and just sentencing systems require a basic understanding of
"what sentencing is for and what it can do."'' 2 He concludes that
"[u] nless we are clear about [the purposes and functions of sen-
tencing], we will not have much success at designing sensible,
effective, and workable systems for the twenty-first century.'0 3 In
applying Tonry's standards to the FSG, one sees clearly that the
Guidelines were all form with minimal underlying function.
98. Frankel, supra note 7, at 4.
99. Frankel, supra note 79, at 2051. See also Tonry, supra note 84, at 14 ("[T]he U.S.
Sentencing Commission did not make the guidelines' normative purposes clear.").
100. PaulJ. De Muniz, the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, and Michael A.
Wolff, a judge and the former Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, argue that
"[r]ational sentencing requires that we identify our purposes, then intelligently pursue them
within means that are available as a matter of law, proportionality, risk, and priority." Mi-
chael A. Wolff & Paul J. De Muniz, Mainstream Sentencing-The Urgent Need for Dramatic
Reform, 92JUDICATURE 165, 165 (2009).
101. Tonry, supra note 84.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
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2. Outcome-Only Focus Misses the Point
When passing the FSG, Congress equated similar sentences for
similar crimes with certainty and fairness.0 4 However, simply be-
cause two individuals receive the same approximate sentence for
the same crime charged does not mean that the potential for injus-
tice and discrepancy has been removed.'0 Our current justice
system is premised on the idea that fair sentences involve a full
consideration of the particular facts in each case.10 6 If this was not
true, and we strictly equated predictability with justice, Congress
would do away with discretion in sentencing altogether and pro-
scribe a set sentence for each offense with no possibility of
deviation. That is not how our system works, however. Even the
FSG left room for some variation.' 7 As some critics have noted,
"the fixation on reducing sentencing disparity that results from the
exercise of judicial discretion has been a mistake of tragic propor-
tions."'0 s A fair sentence is more than its outcome; instead, "[a] just
sentence must also be a reasoned sentence and a proportional sen-
tence, imposed through procedures that comport with basic
understandings of fairness and due process of law in a constitu-
tional scheme of checks and balances."'0 9 A mechanical sentence,
prescribed by a grid that lines up an individual's prior history with
the level of the offense charged, blindly assumes that the discretion
used to bring those charges-and to set the sentence stipulated-is
fair."10
Such blind faith demonstrates either a deep naivet6 or a willful
ignorance of the way our system functions in two central ways.
First, large bureaucracies require compromise, flexibility, and in-
exactitude to operate."' As Hart pointed out, statues cannot be
104. Justice Breyer characterizes this decision as one of the many compromises necessi-
tated by the inherent conflict between procedural and substantive fairness in the justice
system. Breyer, supra note 15, at 9.
105. Miller, supra note 91, at 271 ("Equality ... is not self-defining: It requires context
to have meaning.").
106. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. para. 1 (2007) ("Rather than
making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge
makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case.").
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) (allowing judges to issue sentences within a range, but
one that is limited and cannot exceed a six month or 25 percent variation).
108. STITH & CABRANES, FEAR OFJUDGING, supra note 15, at 105.
109. Id. The authors also argue that "[u]niform treatment ought to be one objective of
sentencing, to be sure, but not the sole or overriding objective." Id.
110. As Justice Breyer rightly points out, the FSG could not have been created without
compromises. See generally Breyer, supra note 15. However, as this Note argues infra, in this
particular instance, too much substantive justice was sacrificed for the appearance of proce-
dural certainty.
111. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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written to cover every possible outcome.11 2 A grid dictating sen-
tences cannot account for all variables.1 1 3 Further, Congress is an
inherently political body. As discussed infra Part III.A.3, one should
not-indeed, cannot-assume that the framework used in the
Guidelines is free from bias." 4 In crafting the FSG, Congress cre-
ated the appearance of simplicity and, by proxy, fairness. However,
just because something is easy to apply does not mean it is even-
handed. Even if the framework created by the Sentencing
Commission was fair, basing the assessment of success (i.e., a de-
crease in bias) on the uniformity of the outcome keeps hidden the
process involved in bringing the matter to trial.
Second, prosecutors are not only advocates in the adversarial
system, they are executive branch advocates."5 Shunting sentencing-
related discretion from judges to prosecutors disregards this basic
premise of our criminal system."l 6 As discussed supra Part II.B,
judges are designated as neutrals. They are removed from the po-
litical process and are meant to evaluate each case with the aim of
being impartial."7 Whether or not one believes this actually hap-
pens, it is one of the central mandates of their position."' This is
not the mandate for federal prosecutors. Internal guidelines for
U.S. Attorneys require them to be fair and rationally objective," 9
and general ethics demand nothing less. At the same time, they
serve at the pleasure of the President and the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral. "' If the Attorney General decides to set an agenda based on
political views, the prosecutors must follow it.
112. SeeHART, supra note 37, at 121.
113. Justice Breyer characterizes this as another necessary compromise in the FSG, one
that arises from attempting to balance the competing goals of uniformity and proportional-
ity. Breyer, supra note 15, at 13.
114. Id. at 16 (discussing the "inherent subjectivity" involved in the Commission's crea-
tion of the Guidelines); Tonry, supra note 5, at 9 (cautioning that "[r]eduction of
sentencing standards to simple numerical formulas may provide an irresistible temptation to
adopt symbolic policies in pursuit of short-term political goals.").
115. U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the President with the advice of the Senate. 28
U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
116. See supra discussion of plea bargaining accompanying note 33.
117. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
118. Id. See also Frankel, supra note 69, at 1035 ("Whether or not the judge generally
achieves or maintains neutrality, it is his assigned task to be nonpartisan and to promote
through the trial an objective search for the truth.").
119. MANUAL, supra note 64, at § 9-27.001 ("The availability of this statement of princi-
ples to Federal law enforcement officials and to the public serves two important purposes:
ensuring the fair and effective exercise of prosecutorial responsibility by attorneys for the
government, and promoting confidence on the part of the public and individual defendants
that important prosecutorial decisions will be made rationally and objectively on the merits
of each case.").
120. 28 U.S.C. § 541 (c) ("Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the
President."); see also, e.g., The United States Attorney's Office of the Southern District of
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The clearest example of this took place in 2003. Then-acting At-
torney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum sharply
limiting prosecutorial discretion in charging so as to align all the
U.S. Attorneys' Offices with the current presidential administra-
tion's political views on crime.21 Specifically, he instructed the
attorneys to charge each defendant with the maximum sentence
possible in almost all cases and also said they were not to depart
downward from the FSG's recommendation without permission
from a superior.2 2 Prosecutors were no longer tied to their own
personal sense of what was fair, and instead were shackled to the
political machinations of the executive branch. 123 As Professor Kate
Stith wryly, and rightly, noted, "[p] erhaps it is politically inevitable
that if called upon to respond in one sentence to the question,
'What should prosecutors charge?', officials at Main Justice must
answer 'the most serious charge available.' ,124 The administration
of our criminal justice system, and the locking up of criminals, has
been a strong political platform for a long time.2 5 It seems foolish
to assume that federal prosecutors can remain completely immune
to these political pressures. Unlike federal judges, they are not ap-
pointed to lifetime terms and they are tied to the executive branch,
even if they seek to minimize that connection. Moreover, should
the executive branch overstep the bounds of its power (by firing
attorneys solely for their political views, for example) it will take a
while before this overreaching can be effectively curbed.
126
The FSG failed to fully consider the relationship between prose-
cutors and the executive branch. Due to the nature of a
prosecutor's role in the criminal system, he has a great deal of dis-
cretion in charging the defendant, a power which is intended to be
a safeguard against improper prosecutions. But, as demonstrated
California, Office History, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cas/history (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("By tradition, United States Attorneys serve at the
pleasure of the President and the Attorney General.").
121. Memorandum from Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department's Charg-
ing and Plea Policies, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum].
122. Id. at 130 (" [C] harge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or of-
fenses that are supported by the facts of the case .... ).
123. See, e.g., Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft
Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "Seek Justice," 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237
(2004).
124. Stith, supra note 88, at 1442.
125. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 6, at 211-17.
126. For example, even though a number of U.S. Attorneys were fired improperly by
the administration of President George W. Bush in 2006, this decision was not reviewed until
two years later, in 2008. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF
NINE U.S. ArORNEYS IN 2006 (2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf.
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by Ashcroft's memorandum,'27 if the executive branch decides to
flex its muscles and curb that discretion, it can. Even with an inter-
nal code of ethics, prosecutors can be directly impacted by the will
of the executive branch and forced to make charging decisions
they may, personally, think are unfair. The FSG provided prosecu-
tors with a great deal of power, tying sentences to the crimes
charged instead of those committed, and the Commission ac-
knowledged that this had the potential for abuse by prosecutors.2 '
However, it ignored the power it would be giving the executive and
neglected to recognize the potential for abuse if an administration
decided to strongly intervene in the decisions made by its attor-
neys.
When sentencing, judges act as gatekeepers, individuals who
oversee a wide variety of cases and are explicitly given the instruc-
tion to be impartial and fair. 9 For this reason, taking sentencing
discretion from judges and giving it to prosecutors, as the FSG did,
removes one of the necessary safeguards from the criminal justice
system. 30 This is particularly worrisome when one recognizes-as
the Commission failed to do-that this also gives the executive
branch a power formerly reserved for the judiciary.
3. Politicization Undermines Transparency and Fairness
The Sentencing Commission was intended to be both inde-
pendent and a part of the judicial branch. In practice, neither
really occurred. Justice Scalia characterized the Commission as "a
new Branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress."2' Some
scholars question the Commission members' actual ties to the judi-
ciary, and the Supreme Court has affirmed that the Commission
serves a more legislative than judicial function.2 2 Judge Frankel
acknowledged outright Congress' political power in influencing
the Commission, noting that Congress is the "principal villain" for
127. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 121.
128. See supra Part I; GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 6.
129. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
130. Stith & Cabranes, To FearJudging No More, supra note 16, at 188 ("[T]he judge has
no effective check on the sentencing consequences of prosecutorial decisions. Because the
Guidelines comprehensively and exhaustively specify the weight to be accorded to most
factors relevant to sentencing, the judge's power to depart from the calculated sentence
range is greatly limited.").
131. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
132. See supra note 16.
133. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243 (2005) ("[A] recognition that the
Commission did not exercise judicial authority, but was more properly thought of as exercis-
ing some sort of legislative power ... was essential to our holding [in Mistretta].").
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the FSG's severity.1 34 This cannot have come as a surprise to those
familiar with the political climate surrounding the passage of the
SRA and the creation of the Commission.
The Sentencing Commission was born out of the increasing
crime rate, poor race relations, and growing national drug prob-
lem of the 1970s. 135 These circumstances led politicians to run for
office on "tough on crime" platforms 6 and, once elected, they
then focused on sentencing to fix high crime rates, making prison
sentences longer and doing away with judicial discretion. 37 The
FSG and accompanying sentencing matrix came out of this politi-
cal climate and further politicized the sentencing system in a
manner that directly challenged the "fairness" that the SRA was
meant to produce. 138 The Commission took sentencing from third-
party neutrals, let Congress approve the "appropriate" sentencing
structure, and then allowed for a charge-based system that gave
prosecutors and their charging documents the power to choose a
defendant's potential sentence pre-trial. It is a stretch to claim that
this is more fair and untainted by outside interests than a judge
issuing an indeterminate sentence.
The politicization of the Guidelines, and the resulting obfusca-
tion of just sentences, is clearest in the sentencing disparity found
between crack and cocaine powder.1 3 9 Under the FSG, as originally
written, every gram of crack cocaine was treated as the equivalent
of 100 grams of powder cocaine,'140 commonly known as the 100-to-
1 ratio. Judge Frankel argued that the Commission was not entirely
at fault for the failures like these."' Instead, "[t] he excessiveness of
our sentences stems from a recurrent mass hysteria in which
American citizens and their representatives are led to act as if sav-
age punishments will 'solve' the 'crime problem.' ,14' He goes on to
134. Frankel, supra note 79, at 2047.
135. WALKER, supra note 6, at 211.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 217.
138. See supra Part I.
139. Sentencing disparities, and the disparate impact it has on minorities, extend far
beyond cocaine-related sentences. See, e.g., Wolff & De Muniz, supra note 100, at 165 (dis-
cussing the widespread problems with the current sentencing system).
140. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (ii), (iii) (2006) (providing for a five-year mandatory
minimum for possession of five grams of crack or 500 grams of cocaine powder); id.
§ 841 (b) (1) (A) (ii), (iii) (providing for a ten-year mandatory minimum for possession of 50
grams of crack or five kilograms of cocaine powder). This discrepancy stemmed, in part,
from Congress' belief that crack cocaine was more addictive and harmful than cocaine pow-
der. Justice Ginsburg details the reasons behind this rule more fully in Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566-67 (2007).
141. Frankel & Orland, supra note 33, at 672.
142. Id.
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argue that the Commission might still be a good idea, and it could
creatively get around this problem. 143 This Note disagrees. The
Commission did try to amend the FSG's lopsided treatment of
crack three times, and was rebuffed by Congress each time.144 Con-
gress is, by its very nature, a political body that is meant to
represent the general public-regardless of its make-up or its fear
of criminals. In effect, by putting sentencing in the hands of a
Congress-controlled Commission, Judge Frankel turned criminal
defendants over to that mob of "mass hysterics."
It was not until 2007, when the Supreme Court stepped in and
issued its decision Kimbrough v. United States,15 that judges were ex-
plicitly allowed to deviate from the FSG in cases related to the
crack/cocaine powder discrepancy. In coming to that decision, the
Court explicitly acknowledged that some of the sentences set out
under the Guidelines were not in line with the purposes of the
146SRA. "
The criminal justice system has been inherently political for a
long time. It is folly to assume that a Commission, created by Con-
gress, and whose suggestions must be approved by Congress, can
be truly independent. Anyone familiar with politics and crime
should know that the FSG could not remain free from strong po-
litical influence and compromise. As Justice Stephen Breyer
emphasized in The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises upon Which They Rest, written before his appointment to the
Supreme Court, "[t]hose individuals disappointed by the compro-
mise[s] [in the FSG] may have failed to adequately consider the
way in which governmental processes must inevitably work.'' 47 This
inevitability should have made clear that the FSG could never meet
the SRA's goals of clarity and transparency.
B. The Supreme Court's Unclear Approach
The legal beginning of the end for the Guidelines came in 2000
New jer~e148,
with the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey. In
143. Id.
144. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 569 (2007) (detailing the Commis-
sion's efforts to reduce the crack/cocaine powder sentencing discrepancy from 100-to-I to 1-
to-i).
145. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
146. Id. at 575 ("[I]t would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude
when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence
'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes. . .
147. Breyer, supra note 15, at 15 (citation omitted).
148. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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that case, the Court held that any fact which would increase the
penalty for the defendant beyond the statutory maximum-besides
a prior conviction-must be submitted to a jury and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 49 A few years later, in 2004, the Supreme
Court used this reasoning in deciding Blakely v. Washington.'50 Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the state's
determinate sentencing laws, which allowed judges to enhance a
defendant's sentence on the basis of additional facts, were uncon-
stitutional. 5' Even when the factual enhancement leads to a
sentence technically lower than the statutory maximum allowed
under state law, the Court found that it violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. 152 Justice Scalia empha-
sized that the Apprendi rule was being used to enhance the Sixth
Amendment jury right "by ensuring that the judge's authority to
sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict."05 3 In other words,
the State of Washington's guidelines were flawed because they gave
judges too much discretion.
For this reason, the legal community found the Court's decision
in United States v. Booke 54 all the more perplexing. The Booker deci-
sion contains two important holdings. First, it held that the FSG
are subject to the same jury trial requirements discussed in Ap-
prendi and Blakely.1 55 This means the FSG violate the Sixth
Amendment by giving judges the discretion to make factual de-
terminations that could enhance an individual's sentence.1
6
Second, to correct this problem, the Court excised the portions of
the statute making the Guidelines mandatory.'57 In short, the deci-
sion invalidated the FSG for giving judges too much discretion, but
then, as a remedy, gave judges more discretion. As former Tenth
Circuit Judge Michael W. McConnell observed in frustration, "[i]f
there were a right to 'sentence by judicial discretion' in the
149. Id. at 490.
150. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
151. Id. Justice Scalia stressed that this holding did not mean that all determinate sen-
tencing structures were unconstitutional. Instead, it only applied to the application used in
the present case. Id. at 308-09.
152. The court squared this with Apprendi by slightly altering the sentencing calculus,
holding "the relevant 'statutory maximum' [under Apprend] is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings." Id. at 303-04 (emphasis omitted).
153. Id. at 306.
154. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
155. Id. at244.
156. Id. at 238 (explaining that the Constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases
arose because "[t]he Framers of the Constitution understood the threat of 'judicial despot-
ism.' ").
157. Id. at 258-65.
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Constitution, the Booker decision would be on the money. How it
serves to enforce 'trial by jury' is another matter.,158
The make-up of the majority for these two holdings adds to the
confusion. Only Justice Ginsburg signed on to both portions of the
decision. 5 Otherwise, all of those Justices who found that the
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment dissented from the re-
medial holding making them advisory, and all of those Justices who
found that the Guidelines should be advisory dissented from the
majority holding finding them in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment.'
The Supreme Court later bolstered its holding in Booker-and
finished off the FSG-with three decisions: Rita v. United States,1
6 1
which held that appellate courts can apply a presumption of rea-
sonableness to a sentence administered within the Guidelines; Gall
v. United States,"' which held that there is no heightened review for
judges who sentence outside the Guidelines (i.e., non-Guideline
sentences are not presumptively unreasonable); and Kimbrough v.
United States,63 which (as discussed supra) held that judges may
conclude that the Guidelines themselves contain faulty judgments
and are inconsistent with the purposes of the SRA.
Various authors have provided different postulations for why
Booker came out as it did. An author with a particularly strong ar-
gument, Professor Kate Stith, suggests this may have been a means
of checking Congress and "recharging" the defendant and sentenc-
ing judge after the Guidelines shifted power to prosecutors. 164 It is
also possible that the Court recognized a firm place for judicial
discretion in sentencing. Perhaps Judge McConnell's perturbed
assessment of a "right to 'sentence by judicial discretion"' is, in a
way, accurate. Not simply because judicial discretion has a long his-
tory,'65 but also because it is integral to the balance of power
158. McConnell, supra note 77, at 677.
159. Booker, 543 U.S. at 225.
160. Id.
161. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
162. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
163. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
164. Stith, supra note 88, at 248-49. See also Klein, supra note 87, at 695 (suggesting that
the remedial holding was a means of returning more discretionary power to judges).
165. McConnell, supra note 77, at 677. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446, 481
(2000) ("Both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this coun-
try and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind
and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by the law." (quoting Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). The court also notes, "[w]e should be clear that noth-
ing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking
into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a
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needed for our adversarial system to function. In the alternative,
the Court simply may have been aware of many underlying prob-
lems with the Guidelines, and its confusing compromise was the
only way it could acknowledge and remedy these issues.
IV. REFORM: A RETURN TO THE OLD, WHILE KEEPING THE NEW
The following discussion should be prefaced by the caveat that
this Note's proposal is hypothetical in nature. Even strident oppo-
nents of the FSG have come to acknowledge that the system, even
if advisory, is here to stay. 66 This Note does not argue that the
Guidelines will disappear and indeterminate sentencing and fed-
eral parole boards will return. Instead, it suggests that in holding
with the values espoused by Congress in passing the SRA-fairness,
equality and justice-indeterminate sentencing coupled with pa-
role boards and release guidelines would be a better mechanism
for enforcing those goals.
First, the SRA focused too much on sentencing and too little on
release. This may, at first glance, seem like the same issue. How-
ever, there is an important distinction between the two. The FSG
strictly proscribed the range of sentences that could be handed
down, but allowed for factual findings by judges that could en-
hance the defendant's prison term.1 67 In practice, this meant the
FSG only gave judges the ability to look backwards at the facts of
the crime and determine the desert of the defendant charged. The
individual's sentence was determined entirely by his prior criminal
record and the crimes of which he had been convicted. 68 Ques-
tions regarding deterrence, rehabilitation, and so on, could not
properly be considered.
1 6
judgment within the range proscribed by statute." (emphasis added). Id.; see also BENJAMIN
RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON CRIMINALS, AND
UPON SOCIETY (1787), reprinted in REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA: SELECTED
ENQUIRIES 1787-1819, at 11 (Anno Press 1972) (discussing the norm that judges must vary
their sentences in degree "according to the temper of [the] criminals, or the progress of
their reformation").
166. Josi6 A. Cabranes, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here?, 12 FED.
SENT'G REP. 208, 208 (2000) ("There is well-nigh universal agreement that the general out-
lines of the current system are here to stay.... The Guidelines have become deeply
entrenched.").
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
168. Id.
169. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 46 (1976)
("[O]rientation to the past distinguishes desert from other purported aims of punishment-
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation-which seek to justify the criminal sanction by its
prospective usefulness in preventing crime.").
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In contrast, a system that employs indeterminate sentencing and
parole boards can make forward-looking evaluations that aim to
decrease criminal activity generally and prevent recidivism. In this
structure, judges have more flexibility. Not only could they issue
sentences that take into account mitigating factors, they could also
continue sentencing in the traditional manner by giving a defen-
dant a range of time to serve for the crime committed. Either way,
the parole boards would provide a forward-looking backstop to ac-
company that sentence. Parole boards work closely with prisoners
and are in a strong position to evaluate whether the goals of sen-
tencing have been met. If rehabilitation is the most important goal,
progress could be factored into the release calculations. If retribu-
tion was more important, the severity of the crime could be more
clearly considered.
Creating nationwide release guidelines would provide transpar-
ency and give our sentencing system purpose. Prisoners would be
notified of the parole guidelines when they were sentenced, allow-
ing them to know how long they could reasonably expect to stay in
prison. It would also give the prisoners a clear sense of what our
system expects from them for their incarceration to end. These
guidelines could be created by an independent committee of rep-
resentatives from various groups within the penological system,
including judges, wardens, probationary officers, police and parole
board members. These are the individuals who regularly deal with
those committing crimes and best understand what works. These
guidelines would be propelled by a clear ideological purpose to be
determined by the committee and reexamined at set intervals,
keeping in mind that the rationale for sentencing might vary de-
pending on the nature and severity of the crime.
In addition to these factors, the central critiques of the indeter-
minate sentencing policy in the 1970s have been addressed.
Appellate review of sentences continues to be available and judges
are still required to disclose the reasons for the sentence they have
prescribed. Furthermore, limited research has shown that release
dates issued by parole boards are more free from racial bias than
other facets of the system. 170 In 2000, the Utah Judicial Council's
Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Legal System
("Task Force") conducted a comprehensive study of all stages in
171
the State's criminal and juvenile justice system. When examining
170. See, e.g., UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S TASK FORCE ON RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN
THE LEGAL SYS., RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS: REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE CRIMINAL
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SySTEM (2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://ww.utcourts.gov/specproj/retaskforce/Reportfina.pdf.
171. Id.
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the state parole board and its release dates, the Task Force found
no significant difference between the length of prison stay between
minorities and whites.1 2 This was the only area where the Task
Force found whites and minorities being treated equally.7 3 Profes-
sor Russel K. Van Vleet, the Co-Director of the Utah Criminal
Justice Center at the University of Utah and one of the leading re-
searchers who conducted the study, noted the finding was
"astonishing." 74 He recalled that the researchers had focused on
the finding during the Task Force meetings because it was one of
the few examples of equitable treatment they had found.
75
Second, the Sentencing Commission and the FSG used a top-
down approach to reform the criminal justice system. Sentences
were prescribed at the most removed level, divorced almost en-
tirely from the individual being punished. It is worth noting that
this system failed to decrease crime rates and dramatically in-
creased the prison population in the United States. 7 6 By shifting
the focus from sentencing to release and from judges to parole
boards, administrators of the criminal justice system can realign
themselves with a more bottom-up approach, which provides more
attention to the individual. Parole boards are best suited to evalu-
ate the prisoner's progress and judges can return to considering
mitigating factors. Michael Tonry notes that one of the lessons
from the past thirty years of sentencing policy is that restorative
justice programs, 77 which use a very individualized approach by
focusing on meeting the victim's needs, are favored over regular
criminal sanctions by victims as well as defendants.7 8 Further, these
programs have been shown to decrease the chances of recidi-
vism. 7 9 The current methods are not working. Political interests
and a lack of purpose have clouded the sentencing system for too
long. It is time for change.
172. Id. at 148.
173. Interview with Russel K. Van Vleet, Co-Director, Utah Crim. Justice Ctr. at the
Univ. of Utah, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Jan. 5, 2009).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Frankel, supra note 79, at 2047 ("[The Commission] shares with Congress the
credit for overfilling the federal prisons to something like 160% of capacity.").
177. Restorative justice is "[a]n alternative delinquency sanction that focuses on repair-
ing the harm done, meeting the victim's needs, and holding the offender responsible for his
or her actions. Restorative-justice sanctions use a balanced approach, producing the least
restrictive disposition while stressing the offender's accountability and providing relief to the
victim." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1340 (8th ed. 2004).
178. Tonry, supra note 84, at 5.
179. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have damaged the adversar-
ial system, dehumanized sentencing, and filled prisons to the
breaking point. The Supreme Court made very important progress
when it made these Guidelines advisory. However, this is not
enough. Judges may be reticent to stray from the forms they have
been forced to use for the past twenty years, and using the sentenc-
ing matrix is, if nothing else, easier than making tough calls in
hard cases. Nevertheless, justice and practicality require something
new.
Reviving indeterminate sentencing and parole boards would re-
align the balance of power in the criminal justice system. Zealous
advocates would not have the ability to determine jail time pre-
trial, and discretion in sentencing would be returned to third-party
neutrals where it belongs. But more importantly, release guide-
lines-even in theory-would encourage prison wardens, judges
and others to begin to think carefully about the purpose of sen-
tencing in the criminal justice system. Complete agreement may
never be reached on this issue, but promoting discussion is an im-
portant start.
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